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Practical Lackey: The Impact of Holding
Execution After a Long Stay on Death
Row Unconstitutional Under Lackey v.
Texas
Karl S. Myers*
I.

Introduction

Jos6 Ceja murdered two people and was convicted and
sentenced to death in 1974.1 Later that year, Ceja was incarcerated

on Arizona's death row, where he spent the rest of his life in a
seven-by-ten foot windowless cell.2 During his stay on death row,
he was retried and resentenced due to trial error,3 then resentenced
a second time because the Arizona death penalty statute was held
unconstitutional.4 His execution was rescheduled four times.' Ceja
entered death row at the age of nineteen; by the time his sentence

* J.D. candidate, 2002, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania
State University; B.A., 1998, University of Delaware. The author wishes to thank
Professors Gary S. Gildin and Thomas M. Place and Law Review Managing Editor
Erin P. Drew for their gracious critical and editorial input. A debt of gratitude is
also owed to former Law Review Comments Editor Clinton P. Sanko for his
tremendous assistance during the development of this Comment.
1. State v. Ceja, 565 P.2d 1274, 1275 (Ariz. 1977).
2. Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting).
3. See State v. Ceja, 546 P.2d 6, 7-8, 11 (Ariz. 1976) (reversing and remanding
for new trial because trial court erred by giving jury instruction on flight when no
evidence was presented to support such an instruction).
4. See Richmond v. Cardwell, 450 F. Supp. 519, 521-23, 526 (D. Ariz. 1978)
(holding Arizona death penalty statute unconstitutional because it failed to allow
for presentation of all mitigating factors at sentencing).
5. Ceja, 134 F.3d at 1369 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (noting execution dates of
February 8, 1978, September 24, 1980, May 11, 1983, December 19, 1984, and
January 21, 1998).
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was carried out in 1998 he was forty-two.6 He spent twenty-three
years on death row.'

Other death row prisoners share a similar fate.8 Hidden from
public view, these men and women may spend decades on death
row. 9
During this protracted stay, many experience the
dehumanizing effects of a lengthy term of imprisonment prior to
execution.' ° Some even experience the onset of insanity." This
state of affairs has come to be known as the "death row

phenomenon.''12 Itaccounts for the fact that a large percentage of
death row inmates attempt suicide. 3
A great deal of attention is currently being directed toward

certain death penalty issues, but little of that interest is directed at
easing the long wait of the condemned.

During his successful

campaign for the presidency, George W. Bush faced many
questions about Texas' record regarding the death penalty. 4 Early

in 2000, Governor George H. Ryan of Illinois declared a moratorium on executions throughout that state, due to errors he
perceived in the Illinois death penalty process."

In addition,

6. See id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
7. Id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting); Christina Leonard & Richard Ruelas, Time
Runs Out For Inmate; Arizona Ends Killer's Long Death-Row Wait, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, January 21, 2000, at Al.
8. See, e.g., Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) ("Petitioner in this case has spent more than 23 years in
prison under sentence of death.").
9. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
10. See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (citing People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972)).
11. Id. at 994-95 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
12. See generally Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989)
(discussing how the psychological trauma, extreme conditions, sexual abuse, and
other factors associated with death row constitute the "phenomenon").
13. See Knight, 528 U.S. at 995 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(citing results of a Florida study revealing that 35% of death row inmates had
attempted suicide and 42% seriously considered it).
14. Then-Governor Bush faced questions about the fairness of the process of
death penalty prosecution in Texas. See James Kimberly, Fairness of Justice in
Texas Questioned; Attorneys Group Studies Executions, HOUSTON CHRON.,
October 17, 2000, at A17; see also Raymond Bonner & Sara Rimer, Mentally
Retarded Man Facing Texas Execution Draws Wide Attention, N.Y. TIMES,
November 12, 2000, § 1, at 34. The reason for much of this attention is the fact
that Texas executes more people than any other state. U.S. Department of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Capital Punishment 2000, Dec. 2001, at 1
(revealing that in 2000, Texas executed forty prisoners, more than three times the
number of any other state).
15. Governor Ryan declared the moratorium because evidence of poor legal
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awareness has increased regarding the role of DNA evidence in

revealing innocence or guilt in death penalty cases. 6
Though protracted stays on death row have commanded little

public attention, the phenomenon has inspired some prisoners to
seek a court ruling declaring that execution after such a delay

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 7 Clarence Allen
Lackey, on death row for seventeen years at the time of his appeal,

was one such prisoner. 8 His appeal brought the first remarks from
a Justice of the United States Supreme Court regarding such a
claim. 9 Although Lackey's petition for a writ of certiorari was
denied, Justice John Paul Stevens took the opportunity to issue an

opinion regarding the denial of Lackey's appeal."
In Lackey v. Texas,2 Justice Stevens suggested that execution
following such a delay might violate the Eighth Amendment." His
words have sparked differences of opinion in the courts23 and have
created some discussion in academia." These treatments of the
representation and dubious jailhouse-informant testimony had resulted in the
release of thirteen condemned inmates in Illinois since 1977. Ken Armstrong &
Steve Mills, Ryan Suspends Death Penalty; Illinois First State to Impose
Moratorium on Executions, CHI. TRIB., January 31, 2000, at N1; People v. Simms,
736 N.E.2d 1092, 1143 (I11.2000) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting).
16. This is because recent DNA testing in death penalty cases has proven the
innocence and prompted the release of many death row inmates. See John
Aloysius Farrell, Senate Panel Hears of Death-Row Inmates Saved by DNA Tests,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 2000, at A7; Dan Malone, DNA Test Clears Man After
Death; Condemned Inmate's Case May Prompt More Reviews, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, December 16, 2000, at lA.
17. See, e.g., Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari).
18. See Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045-47 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of
certiorari). Lackey was originally convicted in February 1978 for raping, beating,
and killing a woman. See Lackey v. Scott, 885 F. Supp. 958, 962 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
19. See Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045-47 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of
certiorari). This claim, though "novel," was not new at the time of Lackey's 1995
petition for a writ of certiorari. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir.
1995) (citing Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960)).
20. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045-47 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
21. 514 U.S. 1045 (1995).
22. Id. at 1045, 1047 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
23. Compare McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466 (majority holds that Lackey claim is
likely meritless), and People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1141-42 (I11. 2000)
(majority holds that Lackey claim has no merit), with McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466
(Norris, J., dissenting) (arguing that Lackey claim has merit), and Simms, 736
N.E.2d at 1143 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Lackey claim has merit).
24. See generally Michael P. Connolly, Better Never Than Late: Prolonged
Stays on Death Row Violate the Eighth Amendment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
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Lackey claim,' however, have primarily been aimed at its inherent
constitutional merit.26

The practical effects of a holding that

execution after a long stay on death row violates the Eighth
Amendment have never been fully discussed." This Comment will
explore such practicalities in greater detail.
In Part II, this Comment will discuss the constitutional
background of the Lackey claim.

It will briefly explore the

Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, with emphasis
on the Court's death penalty cases. Part II then addresses the
controversial Lackey memorandum and the influence it has had on
the lower courts.
In Part III, this Comment will analyze the Lackey claim.
Prefatorily, Part III will scrutinize current case law as a whole to

determine if the courts have conclusively rejected the claim.
Second, the Comment will focus on the impact of upholding a
Lackey claim. Part III will explore several possible consequences,
including what affect such a holding would have on appellate rights
and elected judges. With this backdrop, Part III will appraise the
various solutions that have been proposed to end these long delays.
In light of the potential effects of upholding a Lackey claim, this

Comment will offer a new approach to the problem.

CIv. CONFINEMENT 101 (1997) (arguing that long stays on death row are
unconstitutional); Richard E. Shugrue, "A Fate Worse Than Death "-An Essay on
Whether Long Times on Death Row are Cruel Times, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1
(1995) (arguing that extensive study is necessary for proper adjudication of the
claim).
25. This Comment refers to the assertion that execution after a long stay on
death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment as a "Lackey claim," based on
the opinion that produced this controversy, see Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045-47 (1995)
(Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari), and because it is the moniker that the
courts have adopted for the claim, see, e.g., McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1463 ("We will
refer to this claim as the 'Lackey claim."'). A related claim has been made: that
the delay itself violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1488-89 (Norris, J.,
dissenting). Most reviewing courts, however, have ignored this distinction. Id. at
1464-69. The distinction is also irrelevant for the purposes of this Comment. Thus,
this Comment will refer to either or both claims as Lackey claims.
26. See, e.g., McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466; Connolly, supra note 24, at 116-22.
27. Justice Clarence Thomas briefly mentioned one effect of upholding the
Lackey claim in his concurrence in Knight v. Florida. See Knight v. Florida, 528
U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); see also Dan
Crocker, Note, Extended Stays: Does Lengthy Imprisonment on Death Row
Undermine the Goals of CapitalPunishment?, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 555, 57273 (1998). This effect will be explored in greater detail later in this Comment. See
infra Part III.B.2.
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Background
The United States Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment and
Death PenaltyJurisprudence

In order to fully understand the Lackey claim, it is important to
have a basic understanding of the underlying Supreme Court case
law expounding the Eighth Amendment in the context of the death
penalty. These cases govern decision-making under the Amendment. Thus, a rudimentary introduction to this jurisprudence is in
order.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
''
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
Although adopted with the rest of the Bill of Rights in 1791, the
Amendment received little treatment by the Supreme Court for
more than 150 years.2 9 It was not until 1958 that the Court started
down a definitive path of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.3"
That year brought the Supreme Court decision in Trop v.
Dulles." A plurality of the Court, through Chief Justice Earl
Warren, noted that the Court had not yet explicitly defined the
phrase "cruel and unusual."32 The plurality elaborated the phrase,
stating that "[w]hile the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits
of civilized standards."33 It also explained that the Eighth Amendment does not have a precise, unchanging meaning.' Finally, the
plurality articulated the governing standard for future Eighth
Amendment cases: "The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."35 This has become the general
standard for all Eighth Amendment cases.36

28. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
29. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) ("This Court has had little
occasion to give precise content to the Eighth Amendment .... ").
30. See Shugrue, supra note 24, at 12 (noting that since 1958, Trop has
remained the "general philosophical principle" governing Eighth Amendment
decisions).
31. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
32. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99-100.
33. Id. at 100.
34. Id. at 100-01 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910)).
35. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
36. As noted, Chief Justice Warren's opinion did not command a majority of
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Four years after its 1972 decision effectively striking down
then-existing death penalty statutes,37 the Court was again faced
39
with the issue of the death penalty.38 In Gregg v. Georgia,
the joint

opinion' articulated what the Eighth Amendment required in order
for the death penalty to be validly imposed.' The opinion reasoned
that the "evolving standards of decency" test allowed the death
penalty to be imposed based on two social purposes: retribution
and deterrence.42

the Court. Nevertheless, The "evolving standards of decency" test elaborated
therein has been endorsed by the Court as the appropriate standard under the
Amendment. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
37. In Furman v. Georgia, the Court in a short per curiam opinion effectively
struck down all death penalty statutes under the Eighth Amendment. See Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972). Although the per curiam opinion was
devoid of reasoning, the reasoning of each of the five concurring Justices can be
derived from their respective opinions in that case. One reason common to those
opinions is the arbitrary application of the penalty at that time. See, e.g., id. at 305
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) ("[Tihere is a strong probability that [the
death penalty] is inflicted arbitrarily .. "); id. at 310 (Stewart, J. concurring in
judgment) .("[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the
infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty
to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.").
38. See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. 153.
39. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
40. Justices Potter Stewart, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and Stevens rendered the
judgment of the Court, and joined in an opinion announced by Justice Stewart.
See id. at 158. Although this opinion did not command a majority of the Court, its
holding has commanded precedential force. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
335-36 (1989).
41. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
42. Id. at 183-87 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Retribution is
defined as "the need for society to express sufficient condemnation for heinous
murderers." RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 78 (2d printing 1994). Deterrence theory "assumes that a
rational person will avoid criminal behavior if the severity of the punishment for
that behavior and the perceived certainty of receiving the punishment combine to
outweigh the benefits of the illegal conduct." Id. at 73 (emphasis in original).
In addition to these two social purposes, the joint opinion in Gregg reasoned
that the death penalty also enjoyed the support of the "evolving standards of
decency" of the public, as shown by various indicia of public opinion. Gregg, 428
U.S. at 179, 181-82 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Additionally,
the joint opinion found that death penalty statutes are valid when they
appropriately limit the discretion of the jury, thus helping to avoid arbitrariness in
the penalty's application. Id. at 183-87 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.). The joint opinion also recognized that a state could protect from arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty by providing the "safeguard of meaningful
appellate review." Id. at 195 (opinion of Stewart, Powell; and Stevens, JJ.). This
final factor is relevant to the Analysis of this Comment. See infra Part III.B.1.
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In contrast to the years prior to Trop, the years following
Gregg have been markedly different, in terms of the number of
Eighth Amendment death penalty cases that the Court has
accepted for review.43 Since Gregg, the Court has addressed a
myriad of Eighth Amendment death penalty issues." One reason

for such an abundant number of cases is the Court's recognition
that the death penalty is fundamentally different from all other
forms of punishment.45 This approach to the penalty has obligated
the court to decide more cases regarding this ultimate sanction.46

In sum, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence yields a working
basis for understanding the Lackey claim. The "evolving standards
of decency" test governs the Amendment generally.47 The death
penalty is justifiable on the bases of retribution and deterrence.48
Finally, the death penalty is viewed as being unlike other forms of

43. This desire for review of death penalty cases was stimulated in part by the
automatic votes of Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall to
grant certiorari and reverse in all cases in which the death penalty was imposed.
See EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 148-49 (1998). Their votes were
automatic because of their conviction that the death penalty is cruel and unusual in
violation of the Eighth Amendment in all circumstances. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 227
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus, only two
additional votes were needed for the Court to grant certiorari in all death penalty
cases. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and Stevens frequently provided those votes.
See LAZARUS, supra,at 160-62. In fact, Justice Blackmun would later join Justices
Brennan and Marshall in declaring the death penalty to be cruel and unusual in all
circumstances. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145-46, 1159 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
44. A sampling of these issues includes: whether rapists may be punished with
death, see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); whether racially disparate
application of the penalty renders it unconstitutional, see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 292 (1987); whether a non-killing accomplice to a murder may be
punished with death, see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987); whether the
young may be punished with death, see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380
(1989); whether the mentally incompetent may be executed, see Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986); and which jurors are permitted sit on a
capital jury, see Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).
45. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) ("From the point of
view of the defendant, [the death penalty] is different in both its severity and its
finality. From the point of view of society, the action of the sovereign in taking the
life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from any other legitimate state
action."). But see Morgan, 504 U.S. at 751-52 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
"death is different" jurisprudence as a "fog of confusion" and as "annually
improvised" by the Court).
46. See supra note 44.
47. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); supra note 36.
48. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-87 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
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punishment.49 With this background, one can better understand the
underlying premises of the Lackey claim.
B. Lackey v. Texas and Subsequent Supreme Court Activity

Given the Court's interest in various death penalty challenges,
it is not surprising that the Lackey claim has inspired the opinions
of two Justices, despite the Court's refusal to grant certiorari." In
Lackey, Justice Stevens wrote such an opinion." There, he argued

that the claim was worthy of review. 2 First, he reasoned that
historical analysis does not provide an adequate response to the

claim because the Framers of the Constitution never contemplated
modern protracted delays.53 Second, he raised the possibility that
the delay undermines the two social purposes, retribution and

deterrence, that justify the penalty's constitutionality under Gregg."
He explained that retribution is perhaps satisfied by the mental toll
taken on the prisoner awaiting execution,55 and that deterrence
might be eradicated by the delay itself.56 Third, he pointed out that
foreign courts had concluded that the claim was valid 7 Finally, he
49. See Gardner,430 U.S. at 357-58.
50. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045-47 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting
denial of certiorari); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
51. See Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045-47 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of
certiorari). As Justice Stevens has explained, opinions by Justices regarding
denials of certiorari do not constitute a ruling on the merits. See Knight v. Florida,
528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari); Barber v.
Tennessee, 513 U.S. 1184, 1184 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
Thus, the Court has not yet ruled on the merits of this issue.
52. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045-47 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
53. Id. at 1045 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari); see also Elledge v.
Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(noting that executions in the eighteenth century usually took place soon after
sentencing); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that at
common law executions were often carried out at the dawn following the death
sentence).
54. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045-46 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari);
see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-87 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.); supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
55. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045-46 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari)
(citing the Court's recognition of the horrible feelings to which death row
prisoners are subjected due to the uncertainty of awaiting execution, and that such
effects satisfy the need for retribution).
56. Id. at 1046 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). This is because
deterrence is dependent upon the certainty of receiving the punishment. See
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 42, at 73. Delay makes receipt of the
punishment uncertain.
57. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1046-47 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
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proposed that the lower courts explore who bears responsibility for
the delay."' He suggested that the courts use a "calculus" to divide

the delay three ways: (1) how much was due to abuse of the judicial
system by the prisoner; (2) how much was due to legitimate review;
and (3) how much was due to the deliberate or negligent actions of
the state. 9 As a result, Justice Stevens suggested that state and
federal courts, acting as "laboratories," should further study this

Eighth Amendment claim. 60
Three years later, Justice Stephen G. Breyer approached the
issue, and agreed with Justice Stevens that the Court should grant
certiorari." In Elledge v. Florida,62 Justice Breyer reiterated some
of the concerns Justice Stevens expounded upon in his Lackey
memorandum.63 In addition, Justice Breyer pointed out that the
Court's failure to address this issue has caused a "practical

anomaly." '6 This anomaly has occurred because foreign courts
often refuse to extradite fugitives to the United States in part
because of this country's "inhumane" delays in execution.65 Justice
Breyer implored the Court to address the constitutional issue and

thus eliminate the anomaly. 66
In 1999, one year after his Elledge dissent, Justice Breyer again
called on the Court to review the claim. 67 In Knight v. Florida,68 he

renewed many of the concerns he related in Elledge.69 He noted the
Justice Stevens also noted that one of these foreign courts concluded that
execution after such a delay would violate section ten of the English Bill of Rights
of 1689, a precursor to the Eighth Amendment. Id. (Stevens, J., respecting denial
of certiorari).
58. Id. at 1047 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
59. Id. (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
60. Id. (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
61. Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
62. 525 U.S. 944 (1998). Elledge was originally sentenced to death in 1975 for
the rape and murder of a woman. See Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla.
1977).
63. See Elledge, 525 U.S. at 944 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (noting that the purposes of the death penalty might not be served by
such a delay, among other things).
64. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
65. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
66. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
67. See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993-99 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
68. 528 U.S. 990 (1999). Knight was originally sentenced to death in 1975 for
murdering two people. See id. at 994 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Knight v. State, 338 So. 2d 201, 201-02 (Fla. 1976).
69. See Knight, 528 U.S. at 993-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
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suffering inherent in a protracted stay on death row," and that long
delays weaken justification of the penalty based on its retributive
and deterrent purposes.7 ' He also added an analysis of the foreign
court decisions upholding the Lackey claim.
He explained that
these courts, many of which generally accept the death penalty,
have prohibited long delays prior to execution because such delays
are cruel, inhumane, or degrading.73
Justice Clarence Thomas also authored an opinion in Knight.74
Justice Thomas, however, concurred in the denial of certiorari and
responded to several of the assertions of Justice Breyer.7 He first
pointed out that Knight had cited foreign authorities because no
domestic authority supports such a novel claim.76 Furthermore, he
explained that lengthy delays are due in part to the Supreme
Court's "Byzantine 7 7 death penalty jurisprudence." Specifically,
Justice Thomas pointed to the Court's "radical expansion" of the
writ of habeas corpus as a source of such delays.7 9 If the sources of
the delays are accepted, he opined, then the resulting delays
themselves must also be accepted.8" Justice Thomas also pointed
out that simply making the claim would, ironically, cause additional
delay in execution.8'
Justices Thomas and Breyer both discussed Justice Stevens'
invitation in Lackey for the lower courts to serve as "laboratories"
for the claim.82 Justice Thomas found that the lower courts had
"resoundingly rejected" this Eighth Amendment claim and, as a

certiorari).
70. Id. at 994-95 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
71. Id. at 995 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
72. See id. at 995-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
73. Id. at 995 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (elaborating on
such judicial prohibitions in Jamaica, India, and Zimbabwe, among other
jurisdictions).
74. See id. at 990-93 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
75. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
76. Id. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
77. The term "Byzantine" means "resembling the government or politics of
the Byzantine Empire... [which was] characterized by complexity, deviousness,
intrigue, etc." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 201 (4th ed. 1999).
78. Knight, 528 U.S. at 991 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)
(citing examples of holdings that have added complexity to Eighth Amendment
decision making).
79. Id. at 992 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
80. Id. at 992 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
81. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
82. Compare id. at 992-93 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari), with
id. at 998-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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result, opined that the "Court should consider the experiment
concluded."83 Justice Breyer disagreed.' In his view, most of the
Lackey claims were rejected because of procedural barriers. 85 Of
the cases that addressed the merits, only a small portion of those
cases involved a lengthy delay for which the state might bear
responsibility. 6 Thus, he found that the "experiment" was not
concluded."
C. Lower State and FederalCourts and the Lackey Claim
The disagreement between Justices Thomas and Breyer invites
a look at the dispositions of Lackey claims by the lower courts.
Acting on the call of Justice Stevens, some of the lower courts have
addressed the claim.8 The dispositions of these Lackey claims fit
roughly into several categories.
The first group of cases includes those that dispose of the claim
because of procedural defects. 9 Some of these claims have been
deemed barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996,' which limits the time and form for making postconviction claims. 9'
Other claims have been deemed barred
because of the failure of the prisoner to exhaust state remedies.'
The second category consists of those cases that dismiss the Lackey
83. Id. at 992-93 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
84. See id. at 998-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
85. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). One such barrier is
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which bars untimely
claims. See infra note 91.
86. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing four cases
involving delays that might have been the state's responsibility, and pointing out
that none of the four decisions fully discuss the significance of the state's
responsibility for the delay).
87. Id. at 999 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
88. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1463-70 (9th Cir. 1995); People v.
Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1140-42 (Ill. 2000).
89. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 944 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
Lackey claim barred by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996);
Jordan v. State, 786 So. 2d 987, 1028 (Miss. 2001) (holding Lackey claim barred by
failure of appellant to raise it at trial); State v. Myers, C.A. Case No. 2000-CA-35,
2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3613, at *63 (Ohio Ct. App. August 17, 2001)
(unpublished opinion) (holding Lackey claim barred by doctrine of res judicata).
90. See, e.g., Ortiz, 149 F.3d at 944.
91. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, §§ 101-108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (codified as amended in relevant part in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (limiting grounds upon which habeas corpus
petitions may be granted, limiting time for making such claims to one year, and
limiting availability of successive petitions).
92. See, e.g., Jones v. Gibson, 206 F.3d 946, 959 n.6 (10th Cir. 2000).
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claim because the factual record in those cases did not support the

claim.93 These cases seem to indicate that proof of actual delay and
proof of state responsibility for the delay are necessary. The third
group of cases rejects the claim because it has no precedential
support.94 The fourth class of cases rejects the claim in summary
fashion, with little or no analysis." Finally, the fifth category of
cases actually addresses the merits of the claim.96 Some of these

decisions have addressed the merits of the claim after finding it
barred.' This section focuses on those courts and judges that have
addressed the merits of the claim.
1. Rejection of the Lackey Claim-Of the courts that fully
address the Lackey claim, a majority of the jurists of those courts

uniformly reject it.98 In addition, these decisions often utilize
similar reasoning. Therefore, this reasoning can be organized into
several basic categories.

First, courts often reason that there are compelling reasons for
the delay, such as the need for careful review. 99 The Eighth Circuit
explained this rationale: "delay, in large part, is a function of the

desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore
exhaustively, or at least sufficiently, any argument that might save
someone's life."'"' The Ninth Circuit tied this reasoning to Trop v.
Dulles by stating that the delay "is a consequence of our evolving
standards of decency, which prompt us to provide death row

inmates with ample opportunities to contest their convictions and
sentences."' '
93. See, e.g., Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 475-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)
(assertions of psychological discomfort during death row stay not supported by
record).
94. See, e.g., Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995); Lee v. State,
38 S.W.3d 334, 349 (Ark. 2001); Jordan, 786 So. 2d at 1028. These courts fail to
accept the offer of Justice Stevens that they set precedent for the claim. See infra
note 150 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., State v. Hartman, No. M1998-00803-CCA-R3-DD, 2000 Tenn.
Crim. App. LEXIS 390, at *42-*43 (May 17, 2000) (unpublished opinion).
96. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1463-70 (9th Cir. 1995).
97. See, eg., Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 568-70 (8th Cir. 1998)
(addressing merits of claim despite finding it to be procedurally barred).
98. See, e.g., Chambers, 157 F.3d at 568-70 (rejecting Lackey claim); White v.
Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439-40 (5th Cir. 1996) (same); State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d
86, 93-94 (Neb. 1999) (same); Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 52-53 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (same).
99. See Chambers, 157 F.3d at 570; People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 263 (Cal.
1998).
100. Chambers, 157 F.3d at 570.
101. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467; see also People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29, 45 (Cal.
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Essentially, these courts have taken a "no stone left unturned"
approach to the issue. They excuse the delay, because by increasing
the chances that the prisoner will obtain relief, it works to the
prisoner's advantage. 1 2 Instead of viewing such delay as torture,
these courts view it as added protection for the prisoner's benefit. 3
A second, closely related reason for rejecting the Lackey claim
was summarized by the Ninth Circuit: "[w]e cannot conclude that
delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment themselves
violate it."' ' This means that the appeals creating the delay cannot
be made unconstitutional by their necessary result. 5 Put more
simply, these courts refuse to allow a death row prisoner to "have it
both ways" by benefiting from the delay and then complaining
about it. Judge J. Michael Luttig of the Fourth Circuit seized on
this inconsistency:
It is a mockery of our system of justice, and an affront to lawabiding citizens who are already rightly disillusioned with that
system, for a convicted murderer, who, through his own
interminable efforts of delay and systemic abuse has secured the
almost-indefinite postponement of his sentence, to then claim
that the almost-indefinite postponement renders his sentence
unconstitutional.i °6

A third category of reasoning is that the state in those cases did
not intentionally" or negligently cause the delay.1"8 This line of
1998) ("substantial delay in the execution of a sentence of death is... a
'constitutional safeguard,' not a 'constitutional defect."') (citation omitted); Bell,
938 S.W.2d at 53 ("The existence of delays in appellant's case have arguably been
necessary to ensure that his conviction and sentence are proper and not
inhumane.").
102. See Chambers, 157 F.3d at 570.
103. See Massie, 967 P.2d at 45.
104. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467; accord Ex parte Bush, 695 So. 2d 138, 140 (Ala.
1997); State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999).
105. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467; see also Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992
(1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
106. Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., concurring in
judgment).
107. See, e.g., McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466 ("We are not confronted with a
situation where the [s]tate... has set up a scheme to prolong the period of
incarceration, or rescheduled the execution repeatedly in order to torture
[appellant]."); accord Chambers, 157 F.3d at 570; White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432,
439-40 (5th Cir. 1996); State v. Schackart, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (Ariz. 1997); State v.
Austin, No. W1999-00281-CCA-R3-DD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 162, at
*118-*119 (Tenn. Crim. App. March 6, 2001) (unpublished opinion).
108. See White, 79 F.3d at 439 (finding no evidence in record to support

allegation of negligence on state's part); Porter v. Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485
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reasoning is a reoccurring theme in the cases and has taken a
1 °
variety of forms: that the state is not responsible for the delay;'

that the appellant caused the delay;11° or that both the state and

appellant are responsible for the delay."
This reasoning focuses on the third prong of Justice Stevens'
Lackey "calculus," which requires a determination of how much

delay is due to negligent or intentional acts on the part of the
state.'12 Essentially, this reasoning is an exercise in fault attribution.
Without intent or negligence constituting fault on the part of the
state, these courts have indicated that they are unwilling to uphold
a Lackey claim.
The fourth category of reasoning consists of a variety of

miscellaneous reasons for rejecting the Lackey claim. These
include: that the prisoner did not ask for expedited review of his
other claims to avoid such a long delay; 3 that the appellant could
have waived all appeals to expedite execution;"' that in spite of the
delay, Gregg is still satisfied;"5 and finally, that the claim has no
support because the Supreme Court has denied several certiorari
petitions raising the issue." 6
(11th Cir. 1995) (same).
109. See Schackart, 947 P.2d at 336 (concluding state not at fault when delay
caused by "unlikely circumstance" of court reporter's failure to prepare record).
110. See Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that
delays were caused by the multiple stays of execution requested by the appellant).
111. See Booker v. State, 773 So. 2d 1079, 1096 (Fla. 2000) ("[N]o federal or
state courts have accepted [appellant's] argument... especially where both parties
bear responsibility for the long delay." (emphasis added)).
112. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting
denial of certiorari). Justice Stevens did not make clear exactly what would
constitute negligence or intent on the part of the state. It seems clear, however,
that intentional prosecutorial delay or concealment of evidence would be included
in this definition. Other types of delay are far less easily categorized. For
example, would a court's delay in reaching a decision be categorized as
negligence? See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 650 A.2d 863 (Pa. 1994) (delay of
one year and seven months between submission of case to court and decision, in
spite of unanimity of court and relative brevity of opinion).
113. See White, 79 F.3d at 439 ("[Appellant] made no effort to inform the [state]
courts that their delay was detrimental to him or to ask for expedited review of his
petition ....
")
114. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1470 n.21 (9th Cir. 1995). Gary
Gilmore did precisely this after his 1976 conviction and death sentence. See
generally Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
115. See People v. Ochoa, 28 P.3d 78, 114-15 (Cal. 2001) (arguing that Gregg's
dual purposes of retribution and deterrence are satisfied even after delay).
116. See McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144, 151 (Idaho 1999); State v. Lafferty, 20
P.3d 342, 378 (Utah 2001). It is also important to also note that many courts have
rejected the claim based on the reasoning of other courts. See, e.g., People v.
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In sum, there are several fundamental reasons why reviewing
courts have rejected Lackey claims: first, that the need for careful
' second, that upholding the claim
review commands the delay; 17
would result in an inconsistency with other Eighth Amendment
requirements;..8 and third, because the state did not negligently or
intentionally cause the delay. 9
2. Recognition of the Potential Validity of the Lackey Claim

-Although the Lackey claim has been uniformly rejected by the
courts, it has not been uniformly rejected by all the judges of those
courts.
Several jurists, in concurrence or dissent, have indicated
disagreement with complete rejection of the Lackey claim.121
In the case of Jos6 Ceja, detailed at the outset of this
Comment, Judge Betty Binns Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit
122

dissented from that court's refusal to stay Ceja's execution.

There, Judge Fletcher focused on how delays in execution tend to
undermine the legitimate purposes of capital punishment under
Gregg.1 23 She admitted that those purposes might have been served

at the time of sentencing.

She asserted, however, that courts may

not assume that those penological interests keep their vitality
decades after sentencing.12 ' The purpose of retribution, she argued,
retains its force if the community's moral outrage can only be
expressed by the prisoner's death.1 26 Judge Fletcher doubted that
Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1141 (I11.2000) (quoting two courts and resting decision
on that basis). Courts also often rely on the fact that there is no case law
supporting the claim. See supra note 94.
117. See Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998).
118. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467.
119. See White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996); McKenzie, 57 F.3d
at 1466.
120. See Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1998) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting) (expressing view that claim has merit); McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1470
(Norris, J., dissenting) (same); Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 439-40 (Fla. 1998)
(Wells, J., dissenting) (expressing view that such delays are "unacceptable");
Simms, 736 N.E.2d at 1142-45 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting) (expressing view that
claim has merit); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1291-92 (Mont. 1996) (Leaphart, J.,
specially concurring) (expressing concern with issue).
121. See supra note 120.
122. See Ceja, 134 F.3d at 1369 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). The courts, in general,
freely grant stays of execution because the state usually does not suffer irreparable
harm from the delayed execution. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467.
123. Ceja, 134 F.3d at 1372-76 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). But see People v.
Ochoa, 28 P.3d 78, 114-15 (Cal. 2001) (arguing that Gregg's dual purposes of
retribution and deterrence are satisfied even after the delay).
124. Ceja, 134 F.3d at 1374 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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the outrage of the community had been sustained for the twentythree years since Ceja's sentence.'
In addition, she discounted any
remaining deterrent effect, because such an effect is only served if
punishment is swiftly imposed.'
As a result, Judge Fletcher
asserted that the claim was valid and that the court should have
granted a stay.129
More disagreement with outright rejection of Lackey claims
came in a 1998 decision from the Supreme Court of Florida.13 ° In
that case, then-Justice Charles T. Wells 3' expressed his intolerance
for delays in execution.132 Although he did not endorse Lackey
claims, he opined that delays in execution are "totally
unacceptable."'33 He also asserted that "[t]he courts and the State
must be able to do better, and any explanation of why we are
unable to do so is insufficient."'' He deemed both his court and the
state to be responsible for correcting these delays.'35
Finally, two jurists have persuasively argued in support of the
Lackey claim.'36 Chief Justice Moses W. Harrison II of the Supreme
Court of Illinois wrote, in vivid terms:
[T]he State must normally be given the opportunity to correct
its mistakes and retry a defendant whose trial was found to be
flawed. There must be a point, however, at which the court
steps in and says enough is enough. Beyond a certain number of
years and a certain number of failed attempts by the State to
secure a constitutionally valid sentence of death, the litigation
becomes a form of torture in and of itself. It is as if the State
were holding a defective pistol to the defendant's head day and
night for years on end and the weapon kept misfiring. It may

127. Id. at 1373-74 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
12& Id. at 1375-76 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 1378 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
130. See Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 439-40 (Fla. 1998) (Wells, J.,
dissenting). As its name suggests, this is the same case as Knight v. Florida. See
generally Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999). See supra note 68, and infra notes
181-83 and accompanying text, for the facts of this case.
131. Charles T. Wells is now Chief Justice of Florida.
132. Knight, 746 So. 2d at 439-40 (Wells, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (Wells, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Wells, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 439 (Wells, J., dissenting).
136. See People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1142-45 (Ill. 2000) (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1291-92 (Mont. 1996) (Leaphart, J.,
specially concurring).
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eventually go off, but then again, it may not, and the defendant
has no way to be sure.

117

Justice W. William Leaphart of the Supreme Court of Montana
wrote in similar terms:
Assume that a trial court imposed the following sentence: "I
hereby sentence you to death. However, I am not going to
advise you as to when you will be executed. You may be
executed tomorrow, in six months, in two years or perhaps not
for thirteen years." I have little doubt that such a sentence
would be considered cruel and unusual punishment under the
[Eighth] Amendment ....Although such a sentence was not
imposed in the present case, the end result is no different. 118
By utilizing such a metaphorical approach, these jurists have made
persuasive arguments in support of Lackey claims.
III. Analysis
A. Is the "Experiment" Over?
The answer to the question of whether the Lackey
"experiment" is concluded depends on questions of definition.
Justice Thomas viewed the claim broadly, defining it as delay
caused by a defendant's "avail[ing] himself of the panoply of
appellate and collateral procedures and then complain[ing] when
his execution is delayed."13 9 Justice Breyer, on the other hand,
defined the claim much more narrowly. He viewed the claim as
delay "flowing in significant part from constitutionally defective
death penalty procedures. "'' ° He disagreed with Justice Thomas
because Justice Breyer found only four cases that involved lengthy
delays for which the state might bear responsibility.14 He further
137. Simms, 736 N.E.2d at 1143 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). In Simms, the
prisoner had been on death row since 1985. Id. (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). His
death sentence had been reversed and re-imposed twice. Id. at 1142 (Harrison,
C.J., dissenting).
138. Smith, 931 P.2d at 1291 (Leaphart, J., specially concurring). In Smith, the
prisoner had been convicted and sentenced to death in 1983. Id. at 1275. His
death sentence had been reversed and re-imposed twice. Id. at 1275-76.
139. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari).
140. Id. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). This implies
that delay caused by faulty state procedures amounts to negligence on the part of
the state.
141. Justice Breyer cited the following cases: Ex parte Bush, 695 So. 2d 138
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asserted that none of those cases discussed the Lackey issue at
length.142
If Justice Breyer's approach is employed, then it appears to be

true that the "experiment" is only partially concluded. In most
cases that have addressed the Lackey claim, the courts have not
faced the narrow issue of whether execution following delay would
be unconstitutional where the state is at fault. 143 Thus, there may be

viability in the Lackey claim in the narrow circumstance where the
state is at fault for the delay.
On the other hand, Justice Thomas correctly asserts that the
courts have "resoundingly" rejected the claim because no court has
upheld it. Although his general approach yields this result, it

remains that none of the cases specifically address the claim that
relief should be given where the delays are the responsibility of the

state. When responsibility is parsed in this fashion, the decisions
carry less force.
This is especially the case given the manner in which some
courts have disposed of the issue. Although some courts have fully

explained their reasoning, many have simply quoted the reasoning
of other courts and rested on that alone.'" Others have dismissed
the claim in cursory fashion without analysis.14 ' The reason that this

detracts from the "resounding" nature of the decisions is that it
shows that these courts refuse to fully address the claim for
themselves. Furthermore, some courts even appear to reason that
(Ala. 1997); People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1998); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d
1272 (Mont. 1996); and Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Crim.App. 1996). Like
Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer did not define what he meant by state
responsibility. See supra note 112.
142. Knight, 528 U.S. at 998-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
143. See, e.g., People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1141-42 (Ill. 2000) (specifically
declining to address whether the delay would be cruel and unusual if the state is to
blame for it); see also White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996) (implicitly
indicating possibility that if motion for expedited review made, "bona fide claims
of malicious or intentional state delay" might be valid). Although it seems that
none of the treatments of the Lackey claim have sought to define "state
responsibility" or "state fault," this Comment considers these terms to mean.
unjustifiable acts or omissions by prosecutors or other executive officials that
directly cause execution delays.
144. See, e.g., Simms, 736 N.E.2d at 1141 (quoting two cases and resting
decision on that basis).
145. See, e.g., State v. Hartman, No. M1998-00803-CCA-R3-DD, 2000 Tenn.
Crim. App. LEXIS 390, at *42-*43 (May 17, 2000) (unpublished opinion)
("Defendant contends his stay on death row since 1983 renders his death penalty
cruel and unusual punishment ....He relies upon memoranda in certioraridenials
in [Elledge and Lackey]. Finding no authority supporting defendant's contention,
we conclude the issue is without merit." (emphasis in original)).
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the Supreme Court's decisions not to hear the issue are persuasive
of the claim's lack of validity.146 That reasoning is erroneous
because a denial of certiorari does not constitute a ruling on the
147
merits.
In addition, many of the courts that have rejected the claim
have relied on the fact that there are no domestic cases that support
the Lackey claim.4 8 This type of reasoning further weakens the
"resounding" nature of the cases because it is simply a refusal of
Justice Stevens' invitation in Lackey. In Lackey, Justice Stevens
asked the lower courts to explore this novel claim. 149 By relying on
the fact that there are no cases to support Lackey claims, those
courts refuse to create the substantive precedent that Justice
Stevens requested."'
B. The ProblematicResults of Upholding the Lackey Claim
It appears, therefore, that the narrow remnant of the Lackey
claim, based on state-precipitated delay, may have vitality. Thus, it
is important to examine what effects this claim could produce if
upheld. Such effects could prove very problematic.
There are several problems associated with upholding a
Lackey claim. These include the conflict that is created by limiting
the time allowed for appeals. There is also the potential that judges
will reject claims or refuse to grant stay applications with merit in
order to avoid a Lackey "violation."5' ' The claim may, regardless of
how it is defined, encourage additional appeals. The claim also
creates problems regarding the division of responsibility for delays
between the state and the prisoner. This section will address each
of these problems in turn.

146. See McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144, 151 (Idaho 1999); State v. Lafferty, 20
P.3d 342, 378 (Utah 2001).
147. See supra note 51.
14& See, e.g., Lee v. State, 38 S.W.3d 334, 349 (Ark. 2001); Knight v. State, 746
So. 2d 423, 437 (Fla. 1998).
149. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial
of certiorari).
150. Although it is true that Justice Stevens' opinion respecting the denial of
certiorari in Lackey is not binding, see supra note 51, courts that utilize this
reasoning still detract from the resounding nature of the decisions. See State v.
McKenzie, 894 P.2d 289, 294-95 (Mont. 1995) (Leaphart, J., dissenting) (arguing
for substantive analysis of Lackey claim in spite of non-binding nature of Justice
Stevens' opinion).
151. There is not yet such a thing as a Lackey "violation." The term is utilized
for purposes of this example only.
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1. Pressureon Appeals Applied by a Lackey "Rule"-First, if
a court were to uphold a Lackey claim, it would create a conflict
between Lackey claims, which are intended to redress an Eighth
Amendment violation, and meaningful appellate review, which
itself is designed to satisfy the Amendment. The problem is,
because the purpose of the Lackey claim is to reduce delay, it
brings with it the concurrent danger of placing pressure on the
appeal process essential to the Eighth Amendment.
One of the principal underpinnings of Gregg is the "safeguard
of meaningful appellate review" in death penalty cases.152 It would
seem, then, that upholding the Lackey claim would place that in
jeopardy. The practical effect would be diametrically opposed
constitutional requirements: one necessitating delay (appellate
review), the other requiring promptness (Lackey). This is an
undesirable conflict.153
The joint opinion in Gregg, however, did not require
meaningful appellate review."' It merely explained that it was one
of a variety of factors that could be utilized to combat
arbitrariness."' Appellate review persuaded the authors of the joint
opinion to uphold the death penalty in Gregg because it helped
"ensure that death sentences are not imposed capriciously or in a
'
freakish manner."156
Thus, "meaningful appellate review" was not

152. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell,
and Stevens, JJ.); see also supra note 42.
153. For another discussion of this point, see Dan Crocker, Note, Extended
Stays: Does Lengthy Imprisonment on Death Row Undermine the Goals of Capital
Punishment?, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 555, 572-73 (1998) ("One result of this
'meaningful appellate review,' however, has been an increase in the average length
of imprisonment on death row. If an extended delay in execution is itself cruel and
unusual punishment, a lengthy confinement on death row may violate the Eighth
Amendment. If the Eighth Amendment must be violated in order to satisfy the
Fourteenth Amendment, and vice versa, this internal conflict may justify ruling
capital punishment unconstitutional.").
154. Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1473 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he [Supreme]
Court has not explicitly held that the right to appeal a death sentence is
constitutionally required ....
").But see Rust v. Hopkins, 984 F.2d 1486, 1493 (8th
Cir. 1993) ("[A]ppellate review has been a crucial factor in the Supreme Court's
upholding the constitutionality of state capital punishment schemes ....
");
Campbell v. Blodgett, 982 F.2d 1321, 1330 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he Constitution
may require some form of meaningful appellate review ...").
155. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)
("The provision for appellate review in the [state's] capital-sentencing system
serves as a check against the random or arbitraryimposition of the death penalty."
(emphasis added)).
156. Id. at 195 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
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required simply to provide a general right to appeal in all death
penalty cases.
Some judges have pointed out that the "death is different"
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court would probably require a right
to extensive appeals in death penalty cases.157 In fact, some Justices
of the Court have acknowledged the importance of post-conviction
appellate review in such cases."' Despite this emphasis on review,
however, there remains no explicit requirement of appellate review
159
in death penalty cases.
The lack of appeal rights in these cases makes upholding the
Lackey claim very dangerous for those on death row that wish to
pursue appeals. Those initially successful with the claim might be
aided and may receive relief. But in the future, states would be
pressured to set earlier execution dates. Otherwise, more planned
executions might be ruled unconstitutional because of state delay.
The potential issuance of stays of execution aside, such haste could
force death row prisoners to their executions without the extended
appeals they might desire.1"
The Lackey claim is thus an unwise undertaking for those
concerned with the best interests of death row inmates' appeals.
The interests of assuring fair trials and proper death sentences
demand the time needed for fair and deliberative appeals. Rushing
executions endangers these crucial interests.
2. Encouraging Judicial Bias Against Other ClaimsAnother problem associated with upholding a Lackey claim is that
it may encourage judges to ignore valid claims regarding a
prisoner's trial or sentence in order to avoid a Lackey "violation."'' 1

157. See, e.g., Hatch, 58 F.3d at 1472-73 (Ebel, J., dissenting) ("I expect that if a
state ever tried to deny a right of appeal to a defendant sentenced to death that the
Supreme Court would conclude that the Constitution requires some form of
meaningful appellate review of such cases.").
158. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("It cannot be denied that collateral relief proceedings are
a central part of the review process for prisoners sentenced to death.").
159. It is also important to note that the Supreme Court has never specifically
held that there is a right to appeal in general. See id. at 22 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894)).
. 160. Extended appeals are especially crucial to those who are actually innocent
of the crimes for which they are convicted. Rushing to execute in those cases
would jeopardize the possibility of relief for those prisoners. See supra note 16
(describing cases where DNA tests proved the innocence and prompted the
release of death row prisoners).
161. This is not presented to impugn the integrity of the judiciary. It simply
makes clear that a Lackey "rule" would be unfair to judges.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106:3

Justice Thomas, concurring in the denial of certiorari in Knight,
expressed that very sentiment: "[t]he claim might... provide
reviewing courts a perverse incentive to give short shrift to a capital
defendant's legitimate claims so as to avoid violating the Eighth
Amendment .... ,,162 This possibility, that judges will disregard an
otherwise valid claim to avoid pushing the case "out of bounds,"
could be more dangerous to prisoners than the possibility of
spending a long time on death row. Rather than receive the
benefits of appellate relief, the prisoner might instead receive

review in name only.
The possibility of "short shrift" is readily apparent if the court

is composed of elected judges, due to the looming political
pressures they might face.163 There are many instances where
judges have been unseated because of a perception that they are
"weak" on the issue of the death penalty. 16' In California, three

Supreme Court Justices lost their seats in 1986 when the governor
publicly campaigned against them due to their "soft" votes in death
penalty cases.165 In Alabama, trial judges have overridden jury
decisions and imposed the death penalty due to political
pressures.'66 In Texas and Mississippi, candidates for appeals courts
have been elected when they ran on strong death penalty
platforms.167 In order to remain on the bench or move on to a
162. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari).
163. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing political pressure on elected judges to impose the death penalty); see
generally Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 760 (1995); Patricia L. Ragone & J. Michael Williams, The Death Penalty
in the Twenty-First Century, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 239 (1995).
164. Bright & Keenan, supra note 163, at 760-61; Ragone & Williams, supra
note 163, at 283-84.
165. Bright & Keenan, supra note 163, at 760-61 (describing the 1986 California
judicial campaign, during which Governor George Deukmejian publicly
denounced three Supreme Court Justices for their votes in death penalty cases; all
three lost their seats in the election).
166. Harris, 513 U.S. at 521-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that Alabama
judges, elected every six years, "have vetoed only five jury recommendations of
death, but they have condemned 47 defendants whom juries would have spared.").
167. Bright & Keenan, supra note 163, at 762-65 (describing several Texas and
Mississippi judicial elections in which the death penalty was a major issue). One
noteworthy incident was the 1994 election of Stephen W. Mansfield, who ran on a
strong death penalty platform, to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Bright
& Keenan, supra note 163, at 762. Mansfield won the election, despite revelations
that he had lied about his past, including the fact that he had been fined in Florida
for practicing law without a license. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 163, at 762.
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higher court, elected judges may perceive that they must give

unwavering support for the death penalty.'9
Given this politically charged backdrop, it seems evident what
elected judges would be forced to do with a valid claim on the eve
of a Lackey "violation." On one hand, the elected judge could

uphold the valid claim, cause a Lackey "violation," and provide an
opponent with campaign fodder. On the other hand, the same
judge could disregard a valid claim, avoid the Lackey problem, and

be in a better position to win the next election. This quandary is an
unenviable position for any elected official, and is unfair to our
judges, who are charged with dispensing justice and upholding the
law.
3. Encouraging Judicial Bias Against Granting Stays of
Execution-The third problem, a corollary to that facing elected
judges, is that the claim interferes with the process of granting and
denying stays of execution. ' The Ninth Circuit recognized this
predicament. 7 ' Essentially, the problem is that granting a stay at

the "eleventh hour," and hence pushing the delay into the realm of
a Lackey violation, would create a disincentive to judges'71 to grant
stays of execution.'72 Instead of deferring to prisoners 73 and giving

them time to file their emergency appeals and petitions, courts
would be encouraged to place a "premium on speed rather than
accuracy."' 74 The result would be that claims with arguable merit
would go unheard.
4. Adverse Effect of Encouraging More and Lengthier
Appeals-Another problem is that a successful Lackey claim would

encourage prisoners to pursue additional appeals in an attempt to

168. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 163, at 776 ("Regardless of how one
becomes a judge, rulings in capital cases may significantly affect whether a judge
remains in office or moves to a higher court.").
169. See supra note 122 (describing the general approach taken by courts
regarding petitions for stays of execution).
170. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the
effect of sustaining a Lackey claim would be to "dramatically alter" the method
used in granting and denying stays of execution).
171. This problem is not limited to judges. Governors with the power to issue
stays of execution would also be pressured to ignore valid claims regarding a
prisoner's trial or sentence in order to avoid a Lackey "violation." If such claims
are not ignored, it could mean political suicide.
172. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467.
173. See supra note 122 (describing the latitude usually given to prisoners
through the liberal granting of stays of execution).
174. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467.
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delay execution as long as possible.175 First, prisoners on death row
would simply attempt to obstruct the process in the hope that in the
future a court might find that the delay was the state's fault. At
least some death row prisoners would feel that they have nothing to
lose by engaging in such behavior.
A second facet of this problem is that death row prisoners are
often relatively uneducated.176 Hence, their understanding of the
complicated Lackey "calculus" would be limited and would not
necessarily even reflect an appreciation that the delay must be the
state's responsibility. They might attempt to hinder the process in
the belief that any kind of delay will allow them to obtain relief.177
Encouraging such behavior is not a positive step towards
eliminating long delays on death row. Thus, upholding a Lackey
claim will have the counterproductive effect of encouraging baseless appeals, regardless of how the "rule" is defined.
5.
Fault Attribution and Calculation Problems-Another
problem is the difficulty of attributing "fault" for the delay, and the
inextricably linked problem of calculation of the delay. Attribution
of fault problems occur when, for example, the trial court complies
with existing case law and a defendant is convicted and sentenced
to death. Subsequently, new case law emerges, requiring a new
sentencing proceeding. 8 Assuming that the delay eventually rises
to Lackey-type proportions, it is difficult to determine responsibility for that delay. The courts would have trouble assigning
blame to either the prisoner or the state, because neither could be
expected to predict what new case law might appear. 79
175. See Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ("[If the court
upheld a Lackey claim, it] would undoubtedly encourage inmates to delay their
appeals as much as possible .... We refuse to encourage inmates to prolong their
appeals on hope that they could receive a life sentence .... ").
176. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Capital
Punishment 2000, Dec. 2001, at 8 (revealing that the median education level of
death row prisoners at the end of 2000 was the eleventh grade, that only 10.1% had
any college education, and that 51.7% had never graduated high school); see also
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 27-28 & n.23 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence is difficult
"even for a trained lawyer to master," and that this is compounded by the low
education level of prisoners).
177. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that death row inmates do not
have a right to legal representation during post-conviction proceedings. See
Giarratano,492 U.S. at 10.
178. This example is for the purposes of this argument, and is presented without
regard to case or statutory law that might bar such retroactive claims. See, e.g.,
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989).
179. Problems like this would likely breed additional litigation, causing
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Problems related to calculation are most likely to occur in
cases where the prisoner has been convicted of multiple offenses or
is pursuing multiple appeals.'9 A good illustration of this problem
can be derived from the facts in Knight.8 In that case, Knight was
sentenced to death for killing two people. 82 Several years later, he
stabbed and killed a prison guard, and was sentenced to death for
that as well.'83 What time counts for Lackey purposes? If the state
was at fault for the delay between the first conviction and the killing
of the prison guard, does the time now "reset" because of the new
death sentence? These and the multitude of questions that would
surely follow illustrate that upholding a Lackey claim is an
inadequate solution to the problem of delayed executions9
C. Previously ProposedSolutions
Some authors have proposed a variety of methods that are
designed to solve the problem of delay in execution in the Lackey
context.8 5 These include a proposal to improve criminal representation at the state level," a proposal to fast-track death penalty
appeals," and a proposed ten-year "calculus" for determining when
the delay becomes unconstitutional.'m
The best and most workable ideas are those that advocate for
state-level reforms aimed at cleaning up the process of prosecution

additional delay. That result would exacerbate the delay problem.
180. See, e.g., Bell, 938 S.W.2d at 53 ("The history of appellant's case, with its
multiple prosecutions and trials, illustrates the extreme difficulty of counting and
determining a threshold number of years that would per se prevent imposition of
the death penalty.").
181. Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1998). As its name suggests, this is the
same case as Knight v. Florida. See generally Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990
(1999).
182. Knight, 746 So. 2d at 426.
183. Id.
184. Calculation problems, like fault attribution problems, are likely to breed
additional litigation, further delaying executions. See supra note 179.
185. See, e.g., Dwight Aarons, Getting Out of This Mess: Steps Toward
Addressing and Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 70-79 (1998); Michael F. Cosgrove, Note, Protecting the
Protectors:Preventing the Decline of the Inter-American System for the Protection
of Human Rights, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 39, 73-76 (2000); Jessica Feldman,
Comment, A Death Row Incarceration Calculus: When Prolonged Death Row
Imprisonment Becomes Unconstitutional, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 187, 213-19
(1999).
186. Aarons, supra note 185, at 70-79.
187. Cosgrove, supra note 185, at 73-76.
188. Feldman, supra note 185, at 213-19.
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One of the proposals would

require an increase in the quality of representation of capital
defendants.'"

If carried out, this plan would tend to reduce the

number of convictions reversed because of trial or counsel error.'9'

This is because defendants would be given a constitutionally
adequate defense,' 9 and as a result trial counsel would be more able
to assure that the trial is conducted in a lawful manner. '9' Such an
improvement would produce more death penalty trials containing

fewer reversible errors. Therefore, reversal of any given conviction
and sentence of death would be less likely. This, in turn, would
speed the appeal process, reducing delays in execution.

Proposals that death penalty appeals be fast-tracked are
worthy as well. Essentially, these proposals advocate putting death

penalty appeals at the "top of the heap" of the appellate courts'
dockets. 9' The time between conviction and consideration on
appeal would be reduced, without sacrificing any time for actual

consideration of the prisoner's claims.9

The speedy arrival of

appeals at the appellate courts would eliminate the pressure on
189. See Aarons, supra note 185, at 70-79; Cosgrove, supra note 185, at 73-76.
190. Aarons, supra note 185, at 71-72. This type of reform took place last year
in Illinois. See Steve Mills, Bar Raised For Capital Case Trials; State High Court
Sets Standards,CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23, 2001, at N1. The new standards include these
requirements: that two attorneys be appointed to every death penalty case, that
capital lead defense attorneys have five years' litigation experience, including
felony jury trial experience; that co-counsels have three years of litigation
experience, including felony jury trial experience; that prosecutors must notify
defense counsel of their intent to pursue the death penalty; and that all capital
defense attorneys must be admitted to a special Capital Litigation Trial Bar,
monitored by the Illinois Supreme Court. Id.
191. Aarons, supra note 185, at 71-72 (noting that reforms relating to legal
representation should reduce delays).
192. Under Strickland v. Washington, criminal defendants may obtain relief if
they receive a constitutionally inadequate defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 686 (1984). This right is a major source of appeals in death penalty cases.
Aarons, supra note 185, at 71-72 (noting that the effectiveness of counsel is the
most frequently litigated issue in post-conviction proceedings). Thus, providing
defendants with an adequate defense could dramatically cut down on appeals and
as a result reduce execution delays.
193. For example, quality trial counsel would be more able bring to bring
controlling law to the trial court's attention, thus reducing the possibility that the
trial court would commit reversible error.
194. See Cosgrove, supra note 185, at 73-76 (recommending that a process be
undertaken that prioritizes death row petitions over other criminal appeals).
195. As a result of speeding the appeals to the appellate courts, the danger of
ignored claims could be more readily avoided because most of the delay would
then be within the control of those courts. The appellate courts would not be
forced to rush because of delays caused by external forces.
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those courts imposed by an impending Lackey "deadline." Thus, if
brought about, this proposal could cut delays in execution, without

sacrificing full and fair consideration of prisoners' appeals."9
A set "time limit" or "calculus" model exposes the courts to
many of the problems inherent in a Lackey claim. Specifically,
there are fault attribution and fault calculation problems associated

with a "time limit" approach."" In such cases, it would often be
difficult to discern who is at fault for exceeding the limit. In
addition, an elected judge, faced with nine years and eleven
months' worth of state delay, would be unfairly pressured to ignore

a trial or sentencing error and allow an execution.

For these

reasons, such "time limit" proposals should be avoided.
D. ProposedSolution
With all of these constitutional concerns, arguments, and
proposed solutions as a background, this Comment proposes a new
way for the courts to handle this problem. 98 Although this
Comment does endorse proposals for state-level reform, this new
proposal focuses on what courts should do with the claim.
The courts in the United States should not, generally speaking,
countenance Lackey claims due to the numerous problems that can
The courts should, however, adopt a "shocks the
result.
conscience" test"9 for these cases. This test would result in a finding
196. Another way to handle this problem is to do what Pennsylvania has done.
That state skips one level of appeal and provides for mandatory direct review of all
death penalty cases by the state Supreme Court. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 722(4),
9711(h) (2001). This method provides for an appeal by the state's highest court in
all cases, without the added delay inherent in a system with an additional level of
appeal. See id.
197. See supra Part III.B.5.
198. Although this proposal is not based on the inherent constitutionality of the
Lackey claim, it is a practical solution that courts could utilize if they found such
delays to be unconstitutional.
199. This test has been employed by the Supreme Court on a number of
occasions in other settings. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 84647 (1997) (explaining that the "shocks the conscience" test has been used by the
Court for a half-century in substantive due process cases). Thus, as a result of this
familiarity, the proposed test is a court-weathered method for handling the
problem. In terms of defining this concept, the Court has noted that "[w]hile the
measure of what is conscience-shocking is no calibrated yard stick, it does...
'point the way."' Id. at 847 (citation omitted).
A potential alternative to this approach is for a court to ground its
endorsement of the Lackey claim in the Fourteenth Amendment instead of the
Eighth. This method would therefore not require the "shocks the conscience" test
to be imported to the Eighth Amendment.
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for the prisoner if the reviewing court's judges find that their
collective consciences are shocked by the facts and circumstances of

that prisoner's case. 2 ° For example, the test would likely result in a
finding for the prisoner if the state acts intentionally 20' or with gross
negligence 201 in delaying the execution and an abnormally long
delay results. Another example of such a "shock" could occur if a
prisoner waives all of his or her appeals and the state simply does

not execute the prisoner for a long period.
Applying this test is more difficult in cases where the state has
neither acted with gross negligence nor with intent to delay the
execution. In those cases, the "shocks the conscience" test could be
satisfied by a presumption of gross negligence that accompanies an
extreme delay in execution. In those cases, even lacking specific
evidence of negligence or intent, the prisoner could make a

successful case simply by presenting evidence of an exceedingly
long delay. Because it would be difficult to apply, this presumption

should be approached in a flexible and cautious manner.
This approach dissipates the problems associated with the
Lackey claim. The conflict between the appeals and the need for

haste disappears, because the test's relaxation of the Lackey claim
gives prisoners plenty of time to appeal. The test simultaneously
"leaves the door ajar" for a possible claim if the delay is especially
harsh. In addition, the pressure on elected judges is eased. This is
because the claim is only valid in a few, egregious cases.0 3 Also,
because such claims would be few in number, they would have little
200. Because consensus among judges is desired, this test is obviously intended
for use solely by appellate courts.
201. This means "the mental resolution or determination to do [an act]."
BLACK'S LAW DICTrIONARY 813 (7th ed. 1999). It would naturally be a difficult
standard for prisoners to meet.
202. This means "[a] lack of slight diligence or care."
BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 1057 (7th ed. 1999). This test therefore rejects the proposition that
delay caused by defective death penalty statutes or by trial error can itself be
deemed the fault of the state. This component of the test is akin to the "deliberate
indifference" standard used under the Eighth Amendment for a prisoner's claim of
inappropriate medical care. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In
addition, because the proposed test explicitly includes acts or omissions that
constitute "gross negligence," the test is a looser form of the "shocks the
conscience" test. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848-50.
203. As of December 2000, only fifty-two death row prisoners nationwide
(1.4% of those on death row) had been incarcerated for over twenty years. See
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Capital
Punishment 2000, Dec. 2001, at 14. Although this Comment does not endorse a
twenty-year rule, the foregoing evidence adequately demonstrates that successful
cases under the "shocks the conscience" test would likely be few in number.
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or no impact on the process of granting or denying stays of
execution. Further, because the claim would be reserved for those
few cases, there is less risk that death row prisoners will engage in
excessive and frivolous appeals. Finally, inquiries into fault are
generally not permitted, thus eliminating the problems of fault
calculation and fault attribution.
This approach to the delay problem makes the most sense
because it is cautionary and gradual. It follows the words of Justice
Leaphart of the Supreme Court of Montana, who thought it best to
"err on the side of affording the defendant his due process and
appellate review, as lengthy as that process may be." 2°4 The "shocks
the conscience" test adheres to this guidance by allowing for
lengthy review and permitting the courts to "backstop" that
deferential process. The courts will be able to use the "shocks the
conscience" test as a sort of "safety valve" for those few egregious
cases.
There are a few potential criticisms of this proposed test. First,
it might be argued that it does not adequately deal with the
"practical anomaly" that is created when other countries refuse to
extradite fugitives due in part to the "death row phenomenon" in
this country. 25 It is true that the "shocks the conscience" test will
probably not solve the problem. The only way to guarantee
elimination of the extradition problem, however, would be to take
an approach that matches that of those foreign jurisdictions. Such
an approach would be to adopt Lackey in wholesale fashion, and
bring with it the negative consequences detailed above. 2 ' In
addition, although the "shocks the conscience" test will probably
not solve the anomaly, it can help to ease it. It will lessen the
suffering of those in the most egregious cases, perhaps convincing
foreign courts that in most cases extradition is proper. Thus,
although this test may not solve the anomaly, it is the best
approach, considering the alternatives.
Another possible criticism is that this approach does not
adequately deal with the psychological consequences of life on
death row. Although the "shocks the conscience" test will alleviate
the suffering of those that are forced to undergo egregious delays of
204. State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1292 (Mont. 1996) (Leaphart, J., specially
concurring).
205. See Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (describing the anomaly in treatment of lengthy death row
stays between this and other countries).
206. See supra Parts III.B.1-5.
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their execution, it remains that many others will still be faced with
long death row stays. This is a sacrifice that must be made in order

to maintain the paramount goals of fair trials and appropriate
sentences. As a result, delays in execution must continue to exist.
A final attack is that the "shocks the conscience" test is
inherently subjective. 7 This is intended; such a test must be

subjective. Mechanical standards, such as ironclad time limits, are
subject to a great deal of litigation."l In addition, such a predesignated time limit encourages inmates to manipulate the system
by filing frivolous appeals with the objective of reaching that limit.
By utilizing a nebulous standard that lacks a previously set "goal,"

prisoners will be less likely to engage in such behavior.
The essence of the "shocks the conscience" proposal is that our
society should not rush to execute for the sake of speed alone,
especially if someone might be spared by the appeal process." 9
Instead, our legislatures should be pressured to craft ways to trim
the period of confinement on death row. The courts should only
react to these efforts by granting relief to prisoners in the very few
truly egregious cases. The bottom line is that courts should never
be rushed in death penalty cases. By its very nature the death

penalty is irrevocable; thus it warrants great caution in its exercise.
IV. Conclusion
It remains to be seen if the United States Supreme Court will
tackle the issue of whether long stays on death row are cruel and
unusual under the Eighth Amendment.2 1 ° Such claims have not
207. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 861-62 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(criticizing the "shocks the conscience" test for its subjectivity).
208. For example, one possible problem with such a limit could be: When does
the "time limit" begin to run: upon imposition of sentence, upon the completion of
mandatory direct review in states that have it, or some other point in time? This
question, along with a host of others, would be extensively litigated, further
delaying executions.
It might be argued that the "shocks the conscience" test is also subject to
litigation. To the contrary, litigation will be limited if the appellate courts reserve
relief for the most extreme cases.
209. This is especially the case if DNA evidence can prove a prisoner's
innocence years after conviction. See supra note 16.
210. At least one author has strenuously urged the Court to address this issue.
See generally Ryan S. Hedges, Note, Justices Blind: How the Rehnquist Court's
Refusal to Hear a Claim for Inordinate Delay of Execution Undermines Its Death
Penalty Jurisprudence,74 S. CAL. L. REV. 577 (2001).
Although the Court has not yet addressed this issue, Congress has done so.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 has curtailed the
availability of prisoners' appeals. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

2002]

PRACTICAL LACKEY

been well received by the lower courts that have responded to
Justice Stevens' Lackey invitation. But those courts as a whole
have not conclusively rejected the claim in the narrow circumstance
of state-precipitated delay. Thus, this narrow claim is still viable.
The question then becomes what, if anything, should be done
in such circumstances. Although states should take steps to cleanse
the process of delays, state intent or gross negligence may persist in
a few cases. In such cases, courts should grant relief only as a
"safety valve" where the state-level reforms fail.
In these isolated cases, the courts should utilize a rule that
supplements state-level efforts.
By taking an approach that
accounts for the problems associated with the Lackey claim, allows
for full appeals, discourages haste, and yet permits relief in the
worst cases, perhaps the problem can be fairly solved. Hopefully
the "shocks the conscience" test can satisfy that need.

Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101-108, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (codified as
amended in relevant part in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (limiting grounds upon
which habeas corpus petitions may be granted, limiting time for making such
claims to one year, and limiting availability of successive petitions). Although it is
unclear whether the Act will have an impact in all cases, one can be certain that
delays will persist for at least a handful of prisoners. Thus, action by the Court is
not yet foreclosed in this area.

